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Elizabeth de Freitas
Nonhuman Findings from the Laboratory 
of Speculative Sociology
The Laboratory of Speculative Sociology (LSS)
The laboratory was designed and built in 2013, within the recently 
constructed Brooks building at Manchester Metropolitan University. 
Funding from the Centre for Biosocial Research on Learning and 
Behavior allowed researchers to design the laboratory with the latest 
biotechnologies and digital-synesthetic materials. A Finnish architect 
famous for his innovative but often awkward cyber-buildings was 
hired to produce the plans. During construction, he vanished and 
another team took over, altering the plans somewhat in order to use 
building materials recently developed in Guiyu, China, the electronic 
waste dump of the world.
The laboratory, now “complete,” has been operating for four 
years. There are always at most three entryways into the laboratory and 
at minimum five exits. The shape, size, and location of both entrances 
and exits alter in response to the collective movements inside and out, 
and hence there are predictable patterns regarding where to find them. 
This ensures that there is an adequate sense of difficulty in entering but 
plenty of unexpected holes and tunnels for departing. When the num-
ber of entry points diminishes and the exits proliferate, the laboratory 
tends to empty. If exits proliferate without limit, the laboratory changes 
thermal state and inverts. Inversion involves radical changes in the 
environment, assimilation of the PAI (point at infinity), and eventually 
a highly unstable gaseous state that may, in theory, persist for years. 
Research findings during such periods are predicted to be highly infor-
mative if at all discernible. The lab is a dissipative system — i t tends 
toward entropy. Like other living organisms, the lab itself is both ener-
getic and informatic, and as such is sustained or dissipated through the 
ongoing alteration of energy gradients. After such dispersal and disso-
lution, a period of contraction and reassembling begins, always involv-
ing some recombinant permutation of actants, reproducing a labora-
tory that is always new but eerily familiar.
The Biosocial Centre was initially conceived as a transdisciplinary 
hub for advancing our understanding of human learning. A concerted 
effort to tap into contemporary scientific knowledge and new tech-
nologies while avoiding rampant scientism has fueled center activities 
since its inception. The laboratory is not only or essentially a thermody-
namic system but also a quantum event, by which all individuation of 
object or person is the effect of wave diffraction and temporal permuta-
tions. There is a time technician who micromanages this aspect, but he 
typically fails to coordinate participants, perhaps due to his overtraining 
or to the truly daunting task. Qualiants — which is the name given to 
those who attend and participate in laboratory activities — tend to col-
lectively coordinate their movements through swarms and other imma-
nent group structuring. Thus they manage to achieve forms despite the 
poor interventions of the technician.
The original objective of the laboratory was to study the flow of 
qualia and affect with/in an environment for which all such flow and 
pattern were immanent. Qualia were studied less as intrinsic internal 
feelings possessed by each qualiant (“what it feels like for me . . .”) and 
more as rumbling impersonal perturbations of the environment itself. 
These rumblings were disturbing and difficult to track, especially as 
they became almost imperceptible when a somewhat stable arrange-
ment was actualized. During the first few years of operation, research-
ers found that the flow of qualia was fairly predictable, as long as they 
used rather simple parametric models. Their approach was initially 
modeled on Daniel Dennett’s heterophenomenology, an approach to 
understanding consciousness that combined first-person accounts 
with scientific accounts, a combination of classic anthropology with 
the scientific method. The approach is to combine all data — scanning 
brains, blood flow, and other physiological and ecological information 
as well as interview data of a more “personal” flavor — in order to pro-
duce a more complete image of human subjectivity.
But the methodology was far too simplistic, coding the activity 
in terms of archaic quantifications ill-suited to the challenges of affect 
and nonhuman sentience. The interview data were always treated as 
symbolic and/or linguistic, which produced an overcoding of the 
events, as though all materiality was always saturated with meaning — 
rather than some other effect achieved through such encounters. Find-
ings during this period were still occupied with acausal models of per-
ception, in which, despite attempts to think otherwise, reflection was 
the assumed operation at the heart of subjectification. This optical 
metaphor infiltrated even into earnest attempts to think the quantum, 
because light and visual patterns were still the source of theorizing the 
alternative optic metaphor of diffraction. Gradually, researchers turned 
to a more haptic conception of diffraction, one more truly based in the 
feeling of intensity when two waves meet. The brain scans, eye-tracking, 
and other physiological data were studied for how they converged and 
exhibited smooth manifold structures, using reliable optimization tech-
niques for finding transition state triggers. Of course there remained 
correlations between the visual signal and the intense feeling of a wave 
peak, and participating qualiants recounted “infra-intense” experiences 
that corresponded with subject positions. For this reason, findings were 
oddly satisfying, confirming earlier reports regarding the power of 
affect in shaping identity.
Then in year three of the project, a more advanced real-time 
tracking technology was installed in the recycled floorboard fiber, 
which allowed researchers the wherewithal to study a darker phenom-
enology. This meant that the usual bias toward informatics (docu-
menting signals of various kinds and interpreting these signals accord-
ing to various hermeneutic theories) was radically overcome by an 
energetics that was — at that point — beyond the comprehension of 
research ethics protocols. Dark phenomenology was a way of studying 
energy gradients or contrasts, undermining the very premise of “expe-
rience” as that which is undergone by a unified “one” or “self,” where 
the self was deemed to be a small and somewhat irrelevant bandwidth 
in the energetic system.
LSS researchers embraced a dark phenomenology that attended 
to the calculative affordances of the sensory confound. The new neural 
networks threaded into the laboratory floor were modeled on machine 
learning algorithms that had recently been made public at the NIPS 
conference. This meant that the algorithms were operating according 
to a kind of accelerated abductive reasoning (rather than inductive or 
deductive) and that the laboratory was at the forefront of an entirely 
new image of reason (Delanda 2011; Parisi 2016). This advanced 
computational infrastructure alone would have altered the daily 
working and future antics of the laboratory, but in addition there was 
a fluke weather formation that led to massive flooding across the north 
of England. The LSS was flooded, and its newly active floor achieved 
what no other speculative laboratory had achieved — precisely what 
Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker forecast in 2007: “In the 
future there will be a coincidence between happening and storage . . . 
such that almost any space will be iteratively archived over time. . . . 
Space will become rewindable, fully simulated at all available time 
codes” (132). This new digitally and aquatically enhanced sensory 
environment was then able to bind multiscalar subjects (human and 
nonhuman) together in reconfigured modes of existence while 
transforming human experience from an agent-centered perceptual 
modality to a “worldly sensibility” (Hansen 2015, 197). Researchers at 
LSS were implicated in data mining below and above the time scale of 
the human, so that passive sensing was processed using new digital 
microsensors and powerful wet software.
The imperceptible aspects of the qualiant-environment became 
a source for quantification so that computational matter functioned as 
both remedy and poison for all that ailed the human sciences. 
Researchers rejoiced in what seemed to be a revolution in the study of 
“society” — a term now used simply to name a particular kind of 
assemblage sustained through coordinated movements. The infinitesi-
mal valuations of unconscious encounters were calibrated using a new 
“qualitative probabilism” that tracked fractal differentials across the 
energy waves, putting into practice what Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari (1987) had gestured toward. Researchers watched as the 
affect circulated and contracted into knots of intensity. This immer-
sion-approach, where the laboratory became a sort of soup or swamp 
of big data, forced the researchers to think differently about computa-
tional power. LSS was the first social science laboratory to move 
beyond prosthetic uses of technology, tied as these were to the notion 
of technology as an extension of the organism. Technology was no 
longer offering “scaffolding” for human activity, nor was it used to 
“off-load” tasks that might have previously been performed by hand. 
Qualiants who entered the laboratory were still asked to wear record-
ing devices and plug themselves into various apparatuses, but the data 
“collected” during experiments were actually untraceable in these 
individual data sets. The laboratory itself was sensing the qualiants in 
other surprising ways, stretching and folding the discrete data points 
into a kind of fractal topology. Researchers at LSS were able to show 
how sensibility and quantification were not two different modes of 
being — they saw how quantification and computation inhered within 
every environment or materiality and how even our most intimate 
impulses were deeply computational, although not scripted. Thus the 
digital aspect of the laboratory was as “live” as any other aspect, which 
meant that the entire qual-quant distinction was subtended and the 
technology was truly immersive.
LSS researchers realized that they would need a new “climatol-
ogy” of the social, following the suggestion of Galloway and Thacker 
(2007). In many ways, the laboratory was an expression of a certain 
agony that had taken hold of the social sciences during the previous 
century. That agony concerned the very concepts of the social and the 
individual, both utterly under siege during the latter half of the twenti-
eth century. Influenced by a take-up of the nature philosophy of Alfred 
Whitehead, Mark Hansen (2015) had proposed that the best approach 
to computational media was to develop ways of studying the expanded 
sensory contact that characterized our new “worldly sensibility.” These 
pronouncements, however, were mere fantasy until the experiments at 
the LSS in Manchester. Experiments moved beyond “perception stud-
ies” to a complex intervention into a more-than-human sensibility.
When twelve qualiants entered the laboratory in July 2016 
during an experiment focusing on movement and noise, researchers 
suddenly felt a palpable change in the lab sensibility. They waited for 
four days before a single signal was detected — that strange, almost 
unrecognizable signal was evidence that the qualiants were no longer 
twelve, but seemed to have become a one with near infinite heteroge-
neous vibratory power across their signaling surface. Director Miriam 
Foost declared, “We are surely in the midst of a re-engineering of life 
itself, where a proliferation of non-perceptual sensible data feeds-for-
ward into possible futures.”
The Nonhuman Side of Social Science
The LSS is a work of speculative fiction. Speculative fiction helps us 
imagine how we might do social science differently in that it helps us 
interrogate the very concepts of “social” and “science” and offers an 
alternative model for how they might be reassembled. The LSS is an 
example of how social science can become unrecognizable to itself 
through art and fiction. Such work puts flesh on a thought experi-
ment and does philosophy through character and story. The “specu-
lative” in speculative fiction plays with the apparent fixity of the 
material world and explores fundamental philosophical questions 
about consciousness, time, life, and the nonhuman. The present his-
torical moment, with its particular sociotechnical aspect, is used as a 
base for extreme extrapolation, producing another world that is 
weirdly and shockingly possible. The laboratory depicted above is in 
fact a distorted version of a planned laboratory focused on sense and 
affect, also located in Manchester. My writing of this speculative fic-
tion was a method for opening up the weird future of the actual labo-
ratory in Manchester. Following David Roden (2014), I was looking 
for a way to not preemptively curtail the weirdness of the posthuman, 
using fiction to help me imagine a new empiricism that might be 
taken up in the actual laboratory.
In the example of the LSS, individual actions and actors are 
enmeshed in the water-soaked neural network algorithm threaded 
through the laboratory floor and are thus plugged into the recycled 
materials from the digital waste dump. The laboratory itself becomes 
a stochastic swarming that belies the very idea of individual (and 
hence the twelve become one) while sustaining an irreducible hetero-
geneity. As a form of science fiction, the method involves extrapola-
tion and fabulation, often focusing on the limits of science and tech-
nology and on the spatiotemporal configurations of embodiment. Just 
as science and technology seem to evolve, or at the least mutate, so 
does our spatiotemporal framing of life and being. Speculative litera-
ture asks the “what if?” question and twists the imagined future just 
enough to make us wonder about how life could be different. This can 
involve taking a simple characteristic of this world and continuously 
stretching and distorting it until it becomes almost unrecognizable 
but is clearly an evolution or involution of the original.
The LSS is meant to show how we might study sensation and 
perception differently, how current technological tools are changing the 
very idea of what sensation is, where perception occurs, and whether 
sensory capacity might be reconceived in nonhuman terms, or at least 
beyond the concept of the individual who processes sensory informa-
tion in order to make perceptual judgments. The laboratory is alive with 
computational capacity, recursively elaborating whatever “data” are gen-
erated, so that it is no longer simply a container in which activity is 
recorded. The very notion of recording data is radically reconceived 
through this speculative fiction. If this is plausibly a new image of 
empiricism, it is also a continuation of scientific practice. Bruno Latour 
(2005) and Isabelle Stengers (2000) have shown us how speculation 
plays a significant role in all inventive scientific practices. While the 
linguistic turn in the social sciences seemed to banish the material world 
from the realm of study, declaiming that we are always trapped within 
language, scientists working in the “physical” sciences have carried on 
speculatively imagining a nonhuman world rich with agencies. Rather 
than treat matter as inert and passive, “scientists work by negotiating 
with nonhuman entities, and by entering into alliances with them” 
(Shaviro 2015, 11). This perspective on science, fully elaborated in sci-
ence and technology studies (STS), is beginning to influence the prac-
tice of social science through the work of Karen Barad, Bruno Latour, 
and Vicky Kirby, who turn to the practice of science and the physical 
world for insights into how we might do social science differently.
Speculative sociology might be contrasted to what Latour calls 
“critical sociology,” which he argues is committed to the dangerous 
game of social engineering, because it refuses to study the social as 
that which emerges. The critical sociology — typically associated with 
Pierre Bourdieu — that has come to dominate the social sciences 
assumes a particular concept of the social in advance and refuses to 
recognize the radical ingenuity of life to create a radically different 
kind of social. A speculative approach will instead pursue a sociology 
of associations, allowing the very concept of the social to mutate and 
emerge and become perhaps totally unrecognizable. The test, suggests 
Latour, for gauging the quality of a sociology of associations might be: 
“Are the concepts of the actors allowed to be stronger than that of the 
analyst, or is it the analyst who is doing all the talking?” In other 
words, does your social science come ready-handed with its coding 
devices — terms like habitus, cultural capital, or even rhizome — so 
that science becomes only the coding of empirical data? Instead, the 
speculative sociologist surrenders to the material force of the unknown 
and is overcome with monstrous agencies. This is not fiction in the 
service of metaphor but rather fiction that pursues the monster. The 
monstrous is a more radical break with current practice and a much 
bigger risk than the making of a metaphor.
This kind of speculative philosophy requires imagining 
otherwise — quite literally imagining the thought and behavior of the 
nonhuman, which is precisely what literature does so well. Latour 
claims that “it is only through continuous familiarity with literature 
that ANT sociologists might become less wooden, less rigid, less stiff 
in their definition of what sort of agencies populate the world” (2005, 
55). Sociologists of associations seek innovation and controversy, and 
Latour is keen to point to the potential of art in doing just that: 
“Finally, when everything else has failed, the resource of fiction can 
bring — through the use of counterfactual history, thought experi-
ments, and ‘scientification’ — the solid objects of today into the fluid 
states where their connections with humans may make sense. Here, 
again, sociologists have a lot to learn from artists” (82). The difference 
between this sociology and previous sociologies is the attempt to cen-
ter the more-than-human in the analysis. Of course sociology has 
always been interested in how people live in relation to nonhuman 
objects — be it the material conditions of a geographic site or the par-
ticular media and technology at work in a culture — but most often 
these are treated as carriers or vehicles of human meaning. “Like hum-
ble servants, they live on the margins of the social doing most of the 
work but never allowed to be represented as such. There seems to be 
no way, no conduit, no entry point for them to be knitted together 
with the same wool as the rest of the social ties” (73).
We see here that Latour aims to generate research reports that 
recognize or incorporate non-human agencies as central players. These 
are actants that are as real as any others, but they are massively 
distributed across large networks of association, and it is challenging 
for more confined actants to recognize them as “objects.” Through 
this empirical and practical approach to the materiality of life, Latour 
aims to show that objects do not simply express human power relations, 
symbolize social hierarchies, reify gender inequality, reinforce culture, 
and so on, for all such ways of speaking treat the objects as the carrier 
of human meaning.
The LSS researchers in the fiction above begin with Dennett’s 
(1991) “heterophenomenology,” but they soon realize that the interview 
data overcode all the other data in terms of discursive “meaning.” Find-
ings seem to support what they have always already known, and their 
attention to language use as meaning making blinds them to the other 
ways that language is coupled materially to the environment. Thus the 
LSS becomes stuck — much as social science has been stuck — treating 
language as the total environment and failing to encounter anything 
outside it. The challenge for the LSS researchers is to examine the mate-
rial coupling of speech and other language acts with other materialities 
that operate outside a communication model. In the case of LSS, this 
is achieved only through the threading of new materials (assembled 
from recycled e-waste) and the haphazard introduction of floodwaters, 
which are also laced with the toxic traces of Manchester’s industrial 
history. In this way, the new comes into being.
Social science must become a kind of nonhuman sociology 
infused with ecological insights and operating within the perspective 
of the Anthropocene.
Body, Touch, and Environment
When we study sensory experience, we are conventionally interested 
in how percepts and affects contract into bodies. Those bodies are 
then organized into sensory-motor agents. Perception is a word that 
gets us trapped into imagining a willful activity that occurs in the 
individuated mind of the body — as though the body were processing 
information. The challenge in sense studies is then to think about 
perception as an event that animates particular environments in par-
ticular ways, distributing the sensible unevenly across an environment. 
This speaks to the biopolitical issues pertaining to sense studies, and it 
speaks to the question of responsibility.
Findings from the laboratory of speculative sociology force us to 
ask how the politics of aesthetics changes in computational cultures. If 
it is the affective nature of aesthetics that is studied in the LSS, then 
findings suggest that the embodied nature of sentience is not confined 
to humans; sentience is achieved through individuation, true, but 
through an energetics and informatics whereby changes in energy gra-
dients are the very marks, traces, and messages that constitute an indi-
vidual. Thus individuation is achieved through varying intensive and 
extensive speeds characterizing different gestures. Hence we get both 
the Kittler refrain “There is no such thing as software,” since there are 
always material relations at some scale of processing, and we also get 
an entirely new way of thinking about the material world.
The LSS shows how social scientists might move “from percep-
tion-centred accounts of experience to a broader understanding of 
sensibility as the concrete texture of experience across the board” 
(Hansen 2015, 48). LSS dethrones the human subject as the site of 
perception synthesis and begins to adumbrate ways that researchers 
might study the highly impersonal forms of being produced through 
massive data mining techniques. Speculative fiction more generally 
allows us to explore the expansion of the sensory confound that 
characterizes contemporary computational environments. Twenty-first- 
century media are radically overhauling the manner by which life is 
lived, as microtemporal biometric data circulate and are absorbed at 
rates well below and above the bandwidth of human consciousness.
One of the virtues of science fiction is its power to distance us 
from our everyday assumptions about cognition: “In science fiction 
narratives, cognition may fail because new technologies ‘alter sense 
ratios or patterns of perception’ so radically that there is no evident 
pathway from here to there; or because the sort of subjectivity that we 
take for granted has broken down; or because we encounter alien forms 
of sentience that are not commensurable with our own” (Shaviro 2015, 
39). We see how the LSS speculative fiction allows us to consider the 
broad concept of sentience — a much broader concept than mere 
consciousness— so as to better understand the force of affect in what 
Shaviro calls “discognition” (against the cognitive image of thought 
and mind). This takes us into the realm of what Ian Bogost (2012) 
calls alien phenomenology or Roden (2015) calls dark phenomenology. 
We have to probe the dark recesses of sentience using new methods 
that do not force a particular sensory regime onto it; our task is to 
examine the darkness in the dark, with other kinds of sensors.
The LSS pursues this objective by gradually becoming attuned 
to the pragmatic or heuristic at work “in sentience,” a kind of rum-
bling inexact repetition that always mutates and engenders the next 
iteration. It is not about special cognitive skills but about an “overall 
sensibility” (Shaviro 2015, 85) or a kind of synesthesia that saturates 
the milieu. In this way, we shift our approach to track an impersonal 
sensation. Perception becomes a kind of causality in this world, a kind 
of dispersed touching whereby everything is in contact.
If the power of speculative fiction is to imagine otherwise in 
plausible ways, then the LSS triggers this crucial question: How can 
more-than-human research practices serve an expanded notion of jus-
tice that might counter the forces of a control society? This question is 
best answered by looking carefully at the way time is operationalized 
in any experimental apparatus. Twenty-first-century media bypass the 
slow time resolution of human perception and make material contact 
with the sensory continuum. The technical sensors now ubiquitous in 
every context are registering events at the microtemporal level, and 
these data are fed forward into the futures of human perception. The 
crucial thing here is that technology is no longer a surrogate for a 
human faculty or capacity but instead operates directly on the sensi-
bility of the “total” environment that precedes and underlies our own 
corporeal phenomenal experience. The microcomputational sensing 
that feeds into current data gathering and predictive analytics must be 
seen as exposing the radical exteriority of experience.
What marks the LSS as radical in its findings, based somewhat 
comically on the unexpected flood, concerns this advancement in 
synchronizing data gathering and analytics. The LSS thus is exactly 
where our nightmares of capitalist exploitation can come to fruition: it 
offers a thought experiment in which we can begin to grapple with how 
the temporality of “digital insights” changes the way we do the social 
sciences. The LSS could easily become a nightmare site where we chase 
only the simultaneity of sensory solicitation and response, a goal that 
inevitably serves the “brutal functionalism” of marketing firms and 
culture industries (Hansen 2015, 58). But the LSS also offers a means 
for imagining and building a different sociological methodology. If we 
want to reclaim these digital insights for more creative efforts, so that 
computational sensing serves more than corporate interests, speculative 
fiction offers one way of engendering alternative futures.
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